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ABSTRACT 
Pension reforms all across Europe have a common theme: to reduce the generosity of the pay-as-you-
go public pension pillar threatened by population aging, and to build up new pillars by private saving 
through occupational and individual pension plans. The extent of such retirement saving varies a great 
deal across Europe. This variation reflects, among other factors, the differences in public pension sys-
tems, taxation and capital market regulations. The first part of this paper looks at this variation in an 
attempt to learn about the effectiveness of the various incentives to boost retirement saving. While we 
find a strong correlation between the generosity of pay-as-you-go pensions and retirement saving, 
there is no straight correlation between the volume of retirement saving and the extent to which it is 
tax-favored. The second part of the paper uses the recent reforms in Germany as “experiments” that 
may shed light on which incentives might work and which might fail. We describe the introduction of 
the tax-favored “Riester pension plans” in 2001 and the 2004 tax reform, which changes the tax treat-
ment of retirement savings in Germany from a conventional to a deferred taxation scheme. In spite of 
a deep subsidy and a generous tax treatment, “Riester pensions” have not found much attraction, while 
the originally heavily tax-favored whole life insurance is still wide spread. We conclude that boosting 
retirement saving requires more than simply tax relief. 
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Mind the Gap: The Effectiveness of Incentives 
to Boost Retirement Saving in Europe 
by Axel Börsch-Supan 
 
1.  Introduction 
Pension reforms all across Europe have a common theme: they reduce the generosity of the 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pension pillar threatened by population aging, and they attempt 
to build up new pre-funded pillars that rely on private saving through occupational and indi-
vidual pension plans. The extent of such retirement saving in Europe is the topic of this paper. 
It varies a great deal across Europe. This variation reflects, among other factors, large differ-
ences in public policy, notably the generosity of public pension systems, capital taxation and 
capital market regulations. Can we learn from these differences? Do they tell us about the 
effectiveness of different policy approaches in order to boost retirement saving? 
How to boost retirement saving is an important question. Generating a significant increase in 
retirement saving is necessary to compensate for the cuts in PAYG pensions which in turn are 
needed to keep future contribution rates bearable. We will see that the amounts necessary are 
large. However, saving now cuts into consumption now, so people tend to procrastinate, in 
particular, because the force of compound interest – and thus the power of saving for retire-
ment early on – is hard to intuitively understand. Which incentives are needed to overcome 
this tendency to procrastinate and behave myopically? This is both a normative and a positive 
question. The normative aspect deals with the question which retirement income level the 
state should enforce. Almost all in Europe will agree that society has the obligation to provide 
a subsistence income. This, however, is not the point here because – even after the current 
string of pension reforms have taken their bite – most European countries will still provide 
levels of mandatory PAYG pensions that are well above subsistence levels. Should the state 
enforce private saving to guarantee retirement incomes substantially above subsistence levels? 
There are a number of reasons why one might give preferential tax treatment to retirement 
savings. The first argument applies to savings formation in general. The savings rate is very 
low in many countries.1  An inadequately low savings rate leads to a high level of individual 
                                                 
1 The USA provides the best known example. 
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consumption in the short run, but also leads to a reduction in investments which are required 
for the high levels of long-term economic growth which pave the way for consumption at a 
later date. It is difficult to define in practice how high the ideal savings rate should be. As 
long as the rate of return on capital continues to be higher than the growth in total wage in-
come we can be sure, however, that this ideal savings rate has not yet been reached. This is 
the case in almost all the OECD countries, including in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Abel, Mankiw, Summers and Zeckhauser, 1989). Moreover, in order to achieve neutrality 
between consumption today and later as well as neutrality between consumption of present 
and future generations, deferred taxation of savings is required. 
The second argument is that many people are myopic and only begin to make provision for 
their old age when it is too late. Even if the paternalism implicit in this view might be unap-
pealing for some, there is plenty of empirical evidence corroborating myopia. A more formal 
argument is that tax relief will mitigate the negative effects of liquidity constraints. An addi-
tional factor is that most people have little intuitive grasp of interest and compound interest 
mechanisms and believe it is possible to compensate for the low contributions made during 
the first half of their working life by saving twice as much during the second half, which it is 
not. As it is not possible for the individual citizen to rectify this mistake once it has been 
made, paternalistic logic suggests that the state must encourage saving. 
Third, it also may make sense from a purely fiscal standpoint to deploy tax instruments to 
ensure adequate old-age provision. If retirement income drops below a defined threshold, the 
law in most European countries currently requires that inadequate incomes be topped up by 
social assistance payments. This should only be an emergency measure, however, as othe r-
wise the far-sighted will simply end up subsidizing the short-sighted. In federal systems like 
Germany this would also result in fiscal side effects shifting burden from the federal to the  
state and local level because social assistance is financed from states and local authority re-
sources. 
Finally, there is the more subtle argument of adverse selection. It is based on the observation 
that people who believe they have an above-average life expectancy are more likely to con-
vert funded old-age pension provision into life annuities. Others prefer lump-sum payments. 
This means that private life annuities are too expensive for most people.2  This adverse selec-
tion of “poor risks” can be rectified by giving preferential tax treatment to life annuities rela-
                                                 
2 E.g. Walliser und Winter (1999). 
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tive to lump-sum payments, assuming we wish to avoid the instrument of compulsion and the 
negative incentive effects associated with it. 
In those countries in which pay-as-you-go systems are gradually being supplemented by 
funded systems, tax allowances for old-age pension provision have also been used to accele r-
ate the transition from one system to the other and to spread the transition burden equally 
across several generations.3  Whether these tax concessions are self-financing is a matter of 
controversy, see Boskin (2003) versus Auerbach, Gale and Orszag (2003). 
This paper focuses on the positive aspects, given that the normative question has been an-
swered affirmatively. Are tax-incentives sufficient to boost retirement saving? What are the 
experiences in Europe with different tax regimes, such as conventional and deferred taxation? 
Which other instruments have been used, such as mandatory, quasi-mandatory, opt-in and 
opt-out schemes? Are such instruments necessary at all, or will people adjust their retirement 
savings automatically to the new environment of lower public pensions? What is the role of 
information about the pension system in the willingness to accumulate own retirement sav-
ings? 
This paper thus takes a fairly broad view on incentives to boost retirement saving not re-
stricted to tax privileges. The paper is structured as follows. After documenting the savings 
volume necessary to compensate for the cuts in pay-as-you-go pensions in section 2, the first 
part of this paper uses the cross-national variation in Europe to address these issues. Section 3 
compares the current tax and pension regimes and relates them to the size of the “three pil-
lars”, i.e., public, occupational and private pensions. Section 4 looks at the substitution be-
tween PAYG pensions and private retirement savings, section 5 at the substitution between 
retirement savings and other savings. Section 6 discusses saving incentives other than taxes. 
The second part of the paper tries to learn from the recent reforms in Germany. They are a 
rather incisive change in pension regime from a monolithic PAYG system to a true multipillar 
system. It will eventually yield a valuable basis for program evaluation. The reform process 
included the introduction of private retirement accounts (“Riester pensions”) in 2001 and the 
2004 tax reform, which changes the tax treatment of retirement savings in Germany from a 
conventional to a deferred taxation scheme. Section 7 describes the status of retirement saving 
before the 2001 reform, section 8 describes the 2001 and 2004 reforms, and section 9 attempts 
                                                 
3 Examples may be found in the United Kingdom and Hungary (Palacios and Rocha, 1998). 
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a preliminary assessment of the reforms, obviously at a very early stage. Section 10 summa-
rizes the main lessons and concludes the paper. 
2.  How much retirement saving is needed to stabilize the public 
pension systems? 
This section briefly sets the stage for parts 1 and 2 of this paper by computing an important 
benchmark number: How much saving for old age is necessary to stabilize the ailing PAYG 
systems in Europe? These systems face a common problem. Due to population aging, the sys-
tem dependency ratios will sharply increase, often about double. Since solutions within the 
PAYG systems are limited due to sheer size of the dependency increase, almost all pension 
reform attempts in Europe make use of the added flexibility gained by pre-funding.4 
We use Germany as an example for a numerical calculation of the volume of pre-funding nec-
essary to keep the PAYG contribution rate flat during the aging process. Such computations 
obviously depend on the policy mix between parametric and fundamental reform steps.5  We 
employ a partial equilibrium analysis using a policy mix proposed by Birg and Börsch-Supan 
(1999) which comes close to the current reform path in Germany. Within the PAYG system, 
the effective retirement age will be increased by 3 years until 2035. The PAYG contribution 
rate will be frozen from 2005 on. This will reduce the replacement rate in the PAYG system 
by about 20% until 2035. Together with the existing second and third pillar pensions, this will 
create a mix in Germany similar to what it is now in the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
The savings volume necessary to fill this pension gap is depicted in figure 1 and depends on 
birth cohort. It is based on a financial instrument similar to a group life insurance which cov-
ers all three biometric risks (longevity, disability and survivorship) and is paid out on retire-
ment as an annuity. For the sake of simplicity our computations are based on a standardized 
life course, in which gainful employment begins at age twenty and ends at age 60, the latter 
                                                 
4 Privatization and pre-funding are often used to describe the move toward funded systems. However, they are 
associated with two different aspects: privatization is the creation of funded individual accounts, pre-funding 
means closing the gap between social security benefits promised to date and the assets on hand to pay for them. 
One can easily imagine combinations of privatization and pre-funding during the transition to a partially funded 
system, ands this is exactly what is simulated in the sequel. 
5 Parametric reform steps within the PA YG system, in particularly an increase in the retirement age, can go a 
long way in stabilizing future contribution rates. Unlike to the UK, however, they cannot absorb all the burden in 
the countries most affected by population ageing. Germany, for example, would need a shift of the average re-
tirement age by 9.5 years in order to fully compensate the increase in the dependency ratio, see Börsch-Supan 
(2000). 
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gradually increasing to age 63 in the year 2035. We apply the upper variant of the life expec-
tancy projections used by the most recent government computations. Hence, this insurance 
covers the individual risk of longevity as well as this projected aggregate increase of longev-
ity. Early disability occurs between age 45 and 60 with an increasing probably averaging 15 
percent, the current frequency. Survivor benefits are paid in accordance to the average current 
probabilities which is likely to be an overestimate because an increasing share of women will 
have their own pensions.6 
Figure 1: Saving rates necessary to fill pension gap 
(Percent of gross earnings, by real rate of return) 
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Source: Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999). 
 
The pension or insurance company is investing the accumulated capital in the market using a 
broad portfolio of stocks, bonds, direct placement and real estate. We assume that this portfo-
lio generates the average gross rate of return that prevailed between 1980 and 1995 in the in-
dustry. This was 6.5% in real terms – however, we will also vary this rate in our projections. 
We subtract administrative costs of 6% of contributions, the average for group insurance poli-
cies, 7 resulting in a net rate of return to the customer of 4.5% in real terms. One may find this 
overly optimistic  in these days , hence, we also present a simulation with a slightly higher 
(5.5%) and a substantially lower real rate of return (3.0%). We also assume that this rate will 
                                                 
6  In this case, Germany has a partial offset rule which reduces total claims. 
7  Administrating individual policies is more expensive. This is why we choose group policies that can be bun-
dled by employers, as is done in the Netherlands or, in a slightly modified form, through the US 401(k) plans. 
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decline by 0.5 percentage points in the wake of population ageing. This estimate is based on 
the growth model by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2003). 
Figure 1 shows that the earlier cohorts need to fill a smaller gap, while the later cohorts have 
longer time to exploit the force of compound interest. The implied saving rate (i.e., contribu-
tions to new pension accounts, expressed as a percentage of gross earnings to be compatible 
to the PAYG contribution rates) is highest for the 1965 cohort and reaches about 3.2% of 
gross earnings if the past rate of return prevail, but exceed 4.6% of gross earnings if only a 
3% real rate of return can be achieved. These two figures bracket the saving rate which the 
German government is proposing (4% of gross earnings). 
We conclude that the volume in household saving to be generated by tax or other incentives is 
substantial in Germany. Extrapolating this simulation to France and most other European 
countries will generate slightly smaller gaps to be filled because aging is more pronounced 
than in the EU average. Aging will, however, be stronger in Italy where an even higher vol-
ume of saving needs to be generated in order to fill the pension gap. 
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Part I: Evidence on Tax-Favored Retirement Saving in Europe 
The extent of tax-favored retirement saving varies a great deal across Europe. This variation 
reflects, among other factors, the differences in public pension systems, taxation and capital 
market regulations. The first part of this paper looks at this variation in an attempt to learn 
about the effectiveness of the various incentives to boost retirement saving. 
3.  Retirement saving and the institutional setting in Europe 
This introductory section looks at the crude cross-national correlation between the extent of 
retirement saving, pension systems and taxation. We begin with the large variation in pension 
schemes. Table 1 shows the mixture between PAYG and funded old-age provision across 
seven selected European countries and the United States. 
Table 1: Sources of Retirement Income – Size of the “Three Pillars” 
Percent a D F I E NL CH GB US 
First Pillar b 85% 79% 74% 92% 50% 42% 65% f 45% 
Second Pillar c 5% 6% e 1% 4% 40% 32% 25% 13% 
Third Pillar d 10% 15% 25% 4% 10% 26% 10% 42% g 
Notes: (a) Percent of total income of average two-person household just after retirment.  (b) Public retirement in-
come (public pensions, social assistance, civil servants‘ pensions, etc.).  (c) Private occupational pension income.  
(d) All other retire ment income (asset income, net transfers received, earnings, etc.).  (e) In France, mandatory oc-
cupational pensions are pay-as-you-go financed and are included in the first pillar.  (f) In Great Britain, first pillar 
income also includes SERPS.  (g) In the US, 25 percentage points of this figure are earnings. 
Sources: Disney et al. (1998), Gruber and Wise (1999), Börsch-Supan and Miegel (2001). 
 
In most Continental European countries, notably in the three largest countries France, Ger-
many and Italy, the PAYG mechanism is the most important instrument. There are notable 
exceptions, however, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland. In spite of these differences, 
table 2 shows an astounding similarity in the overall replacement rates. Adding up the income 
from all pillars, we find that households just after retirement receive approximately 80% of 
the income they enjoyed shortly before retirement. This replacement rate is nearly identical in 
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and in Switzerland; it is slightly lower in Great Brit-
ain. 
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Table 2: Comprehensive Retirement Income Replacement Rate 
 D F I E NL CH GB US 
Percent of 
Preretirementa 
82% 79% 80% ./. 78% 81% 69% ./. 
Notes: All income sources of average two-person retiree household just after retirement as percent of total income of 
average two-person household just before retirement. Source provides no strictly comparable data for Spain and US.  
Source: Disney et al. (1998). 
 
The combination of tables 1 and 2 suggests a strong substitution among the three pillars, that 
is, a strong adaptation of the private individual and employer-based old-age provision to the 
public pension system. 
Table 3: Assets and Participation in Tax-Favored Retirement Saving Plans 
 D F I E NL CH GB US 
Percent of 
GDP 
8.6% 5.7% 5.5% 5.0% 116% 112% 76% 108% 
Percent of 
employment 
   42% 90% 79% 59% 53% 
Source: Antolin, de Serres and de la Maisonneuve (2004). Data refers to year 2000. Life -insurance not included. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 tell a similar story from a slightly different point of view. The accumulated 
assets in tax-favored retirement saving plans (table 3) are much smaller in those countries 
which have large public pension replacement rates (table 4). 
Table 4: After-Tax Replacement Rates (Public Pensions) 
 D F I E NL CH GB US 
Percent  77% 77% 97% 92.5% 46% 57% 40% 48% 
Source: Adapted from Casey (2003). Based on the salary of an average production worker at “normal” age of re-
tirement. In France, mandatory occupational pensions are pay-as-you-go financed and are included in the above 
figure. In the Netherlands, mandatory occupational pensions are pre-funded and not included in the above figure. 
 
Relative to the force of public pension replacement rates, taxation does appear to not play a 
major role in explaining the cross-national variation in the importance of tax-favored saving 
plans. Table 5 shows tax regimes and effective tax-rates, using the familiar “EET” notation of 
deferred taxation. Germany and France apply an even more lenient taxation than the five 
countries with deferred taxation, and Spain has lower tax rates than the two Anglo-Saxon 
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countries, nevertheless do play tax-favored savings only a minor role in Germany, France and 
Spain. 
Table 5: Tax Treatment of Retirement Savings 
 D F I E NL CH GB US 
Percent  EEP EEP EPP EET EET EET EET EET 
Effective Tax on 
Contributions  
   22.1% 37.1% 16.6% 22.1% 29.0% 
Effective Tax on 
Accrued Income  
   14.5% 12.8% 12.7% 20.1% 22.3% 
Effective Tax on 
Benefits  
   17.1% 32.1% 11.6% 17.1% 24.0% 
Source: Yoo and de Serres (2004). E=tax exempt, P=partially exempt/partially taxed, T=taxed. Comparable data for 
Germany, France and Italy is not available. 
 
We conclude from this introductory section, that while we find a strong correlation between 
the generosity of pay-as-you-go pensions and retirement saving, there is no straight correla-
tion between the volume of retirement saving and the extent to which it is tax-favored. In the 
following, we give these correlations a closer look. 
4.  Substitution between PAYG and private pensions 
Section 3 suggests that substitution between PAYG pensions (“first pillar”) and private pen-
sions (occupational and individual pensions in second and third pillar) is the most important 
retirement saving mechanism. This is in line with economic theory: models with consumption 
smoothing will predict substitution between PAYG and funded pensions, while the effect of 
taxation depends on the dominance of the substitution over the income effect. 
One actually has to carefully distinguish two kinds of substitution or “crowding out”, see the 
arrows in figure 2: (1) substitution within several types of “retirement wealth”, including 
mainly notional pension wealth (claims on future PAYG pensions) and real wealth (claims on 
assets usable only for retirement, such as occupational and individual pensions), and (2) sub-
stitution between retirement wealth (defined by liquidity restrictions such as no availability 
before retirement age) and other wealth that can be liquidized freely.8  Both substitution 
                                                 
8 Bernheim (1987a and b) addressed a similar distinction, focusing on bequeathable and other wealth. 
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mechanisms are important in the pension reform discussion. The first substitution mechanism 
(people accumulate more retirement assets if PAYG pensions are reduced) is well visible in 
economic models with consumption smoothing, such as the well-known strand of overlapping 
generation models which include both pay-as-you-go pension schemes and life-cycle motive 
for retirement saving (Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) for the United States; Miles (1999) for 
Great Britain; Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2003) for Germany). The second substitu-
tion mechanism (for example, people may buy smaller homes and thus accumulate less assets 
for a smaller down payment when they have to accumulate more assets for retirement) is not 
visible in these models since they have only one savings motive (consumption smoothing 
over the life-cycle) and do not distinguish between high- and low-frequency savings or “men-
tal accounts” for different savings purposes. 
Figure 2: Substitution among savings types (“Crowding out”) 
Pay-as-you-go pensions
Total saving
Retirement saving Other saving
(1)
(4a)
(2)
(3)
(4b)
 
The combination of the two effects – arrow (3) in figure 2 – is the center of the crowding out 
debate between Feldstein (1974) and Barro (1974). Crowding out is an important policy issue. 
A central argument put forward in pension reform discussions is the macroeconomic superior-
ity of a funded system vis-à-vis a PAYG system.9  This argument is valid only to the extent 
                                                 
9 Welfare superiority including transition costs requires additional effects over and above this capital accumula-
tion, strengthening the necessity of new saving. See Fenge (1997), Börsch-Supan (1999) and Sinn (2000) for an 
exchange on this point. 
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that new savings is created which adds to the capital stock and therefore promotes economic 
growth. In this case, the generation of retirement savings through the first substitution mecha-
nism is not  offset by an equally large substitution away from other savings through the second 
mechanism. Moreover, if the contrary is true (“full crowding out”) and pre-funding is in-
censed by tax relief, this is wasted because it only shifts existing savings from one form to 
another. 
The cross-national evidence on the first substitution mechanism appears fairly solid as we 
have seen in tables 2 through 4. Further evidence comes from an inspection of life-cycle sav-
ing profiles.  
Figure 3: Age-specific saving rates (cohort corrected) 
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Sources : France: Fall, Loisy, and Talon (2001); Germany: Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter, Schnabel, and 
Winter (2001); Italy: Brugiavini and Padula (2001); Netherlands: Alessie and Kapteyn (2001). 
 
Figure 3 shows, by age group, median saving rates in France, Germany, Italy and the Nether-
lands. They are based on a comparable longitudinal framework, represent life-cycle saving 
purged from cohort effects, and employ comparable variable definitions and data sources as 
part of the International Saving Comparisons Project (Börsch-Supan, 2001 and 2003). The 
saving profiles in France, Germany and Italy are rather flat and show no dissaving in old age. 
One possible explanation is that the high replacement rates of the public pension systems in 
these countries have made private retirement income largely unnecessary. If other saving mo-
tives, such as precaution and intergenerational transfers, are more important than retirement 
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saving, age-saving profiles are likely to be much flatter than under the textbook life-cycle 
hypotheses which predicts saving in young and dissaving in old age. This explanation is in 
line with the work by Jappelli and Modigliani (1998) who argue that the main mechanism for 
“retirement saving” in Italy is the PAYG system. While we lack the most appropriate counter-
factual – French, German and Italian data from times when these countries had no PAYG 
systems – figure 3 depicts the case of the Netherlands which have, as opposed to France, 
Germany and Italy, only a small base pension provided by their PAYG public pension system. 
All additional retirement income in the Netherlands has to be provided by (mandatory) sav-
ings plans, commonly provided through occupational pension plans. Figure 3 shows that the 
median Dutch household has a much more pronounced hump-shaped life-cycle savings pro-
file than the median French, German and Italian households, and it exhibits dissaving among 
the elderly as they draw down their mandatory saving accounts. 
This cross-national evidence suggests that a pension reform towards a multi-pillar system 
with a substantial portion of funded retirement income will revive the retirement motive for 
saving in France, Germany and Italy. In fact, as pointed out in section 2, these systems will 
look very similar to the current Dutch system. Hence, it is likely that saving rates among the 
young will increase (to accumulate retirement savings), and saving rates among the elderly 
will decline sharply (because they will dissolve their retirement savings). Combining the re-
sults of figures 1 and 3 gives us an order of magnitude for those effects. The net saving rate of 
the average German household in mid age would increase by about 4 percentage points from 
11 to 15 percent, while the saving rate would decrease by about 6 percentage points from 4 to 
–2 percent in old age, when retirement accounts are drawn down for consumption. 
From a policy point, there seems no doubt that people adjust their behavior to the generosity 
of public pension systems like in a system of communicating pipes. Taxes appear to be uncor-
related with these adjustments. The cross-national evidence, however, reflects long-run ad-
justments. Hence, this section does not necessarily imply that tax incentives boosting retire-
ment savings are superfluous. While the evidence of table 5 – high taxes on retirement sav-
ings in the Netherlands and the United States – seems to be contradictory to the high levels of 
retirement saving, these tax rates have been established after a multipillar system had been 
installed. 
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5.  Substitution between retirement saving and other saving 
There is also clear evidence on the partial effects of tax incentives (see arrows (3), (4a) and 
(4b) in figure 2). Several econometric studies using large micro data sets have been shown the 
impact of tax relief on dedicated savings in Germany, e.g. whole life insurance policies and 
savings and loan agreements (Börsch-Supan and Stahl, 1991b; Brunsbach and Lang,1998; 
Lang, 1998; Walliser and Winter, 1999). These studies show quite clearly that tax relief for  
specific investment vehicles strengthen the attractiveness of the relevant forms of saving. In-
deed, they appear to have markedly shaped the retirement savings landscape in Germany, see 
section 7. 
This is, however, not the central issue. Evidence on the total effect – the generation of new 
savings, when retirement savings through the first substitution mechanism is not offset by an 
equally large substitution away from other savings through the second substitution mecha-
nism, i.e., arrow (2) in figure 2 – is still controversial, and a European perspective10 brings, 
rather unfortunately, not much additional light into the old controversy between Venti and 
Wise (1990) on one side, and Gale and Scholz (1994) and Attanasio and De Leire (1994) on 
the other side, summarized by Skinner and Hubbard (1996) for the US and by Attanasio and 
Banks (1998) for a comparison between the US and the UK. 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983) pioneered the discussion on the difficulties with the identifica-
tion of the substitution parameters both in time series and cross sectional studies for the US. 
The structural instability of the parameters is due to the changes in population structure and to 
the fluctuations in interest rates as well as in contribution rates during the transition after the 
introduction of a new pension system. 
Additional complications along these lines stem from the fact that a considerable share of 
elderly households in Continental Europe seem to be “overannuitized”. Evidence by Börsch-
Supan and Stahl (1991a) and Börsch-Supan (1992, 1994) shows that the annuity income of a 
majority of pensioners (mostly PAYG income provided through the public system) by far 
exceeds consumption expenditures. The next generation of pensioners appears to be aware of 
this fact, since saving rates in Germany drop for the now middle aged cohorts. Given this 
trend, a reduction in public pension wealth may not necessarily be channeled into new sav-
ings, or only after a transition period of new costly learning. At the same time, these house-
                                                 
10 The following literature survey draws on Börsch-Supan and Brugiavini (2001). 
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holds, if left to their own devices, may also shun pension assets because they do not want to 
lock their wealth into long term saving for retirement. In short: a careful analysis of the link 
between total saving rates and changes in pension systems needs to be cohort-specific and 
cannot simply use aggregate time-series. 
It may therefore not be a major surprise, if for Europe the empirical evidence is scanty and 
there exists a wide variety of results, making it particularly hard to reach any conclusion. Kim 
(1992) links changes in the retirement system to the savings rate and shows that the German 
pay-as-you-go system has crowded out saving to a significant extent. Cigno and Rosati (1996) 
confirm these findings but explain the crowding-out effect unconventionally by repercussions 
on fertility rather than through the familiar channels stressed by Feldstein (1974). Other time 
series studies include Rossi and Visco (1994) for Italy, who are able to attribute part of the 
decline occurred during the 1980s in the saving rate to the increased generosity of the social 
security in the 1970s. In other countries the relationship between pension wealth and private 
fungible wealth emerging from time series data is poorly determined.11  Cross sectional analy-
sis based on Italian micro data (Brugiavini, 1987; Jappelli, 1995) obtain low estimates of the 
substitution parameter. Recent studies for the Netherlands obtain mixed results. In particular, 
by using the Dutch Socio Economic Panel (SEP) data on private wealth and on (constructed) 
data on social security wealth and pension wealth, Alessie, Kapteyn and Klijn (1997) and 
Kapteyn, Alessie and Lusardi (1999) have investigated the question whether or not  there ex-
ists displacement between discretionary private wealth on the one hand and soc ial security 
and pension wealth on the other hand. For pension wealth they do not find any evidence of 
displacement, while for social security wealth they find full displacement.12 
Clear cut “experiments” in which the pension system changes but everything else remains 
constant, are hard to come by also in Europe. Attanasio and Brugiavini (1997) rely directly on 
a test of  how changes in saving rates are related to changes in pension wealth following the 
1992 Reform of the Italian Social Security System in a “quasi-natural-experiment” setting. 
They find that households whose public pension wealth was substantially curtailed by the 
reform show a marked increase in their private saving rate. Germany will provide an “experi-
ment” with its 2001 and 2004 reforms, but, as we will see in part 2 of this paper, it is too early 
to draw firm conclusions yet. So far, the German experience with its very small uptake rates 
                                                 
11  See Kohl and O’Brien (1998) for a detailed survey. 
12  See also Euwals (2000). The evidence based on cross sectional data for the USA (Hubbard, 1986) and for 
Canada (King and Dicks-Mireaux, 1982), is also rather mixed. 
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of the new tax-favored retirement saving instruments shows that short-run effects maybe quite 
different from the long-run effects shown in the previous section. 
Börsch-Supan and Lusardi (2003) attempt a cross-national analysis exploiting the cohort-
corrected savings data in the International Savings Comparisons Project. They find that co-
hort-corrected saving rates are positively (!) correlated to public pension replacement rates, 
suggesting crowding in rather than crowding out – this positive correlation, however, changes 
sign to a significant negative one, once credit restrictions are taken account of.13 
In summary, the European evidence so far does not add much to the evidence gathered in the 
US debate. This is in spite of the large institutional variation in Europe. While we do know 
that subsidies strongly increase saving in the specific form that is subsidized, possibly to the 
detriment of other saving forms, we do not really have firm evidence that saving-related tax 
relief or similar subsidies increase total saving in Europe. 
This does not make tax-relief a potentially wasteful instrument. Even if tax relief would only 
shift other saving to retirement saving, this may be a valuable mechanism if the government 
wants to make sure that the elderly will have a generous multipillar retirement income. That 
is, even if the government does not believe in the creation of new saving for macroeconomic 
purposes, it still may want to repress procrastination not only in form of consumption now, 
but also in the form of a larger house in the near future, and subsidize retirement consumption 
in the far future. 
6.  Other incentives: Opting in and out, mandatory savings 
The U.S. experience, summarised by Wise (2001), has also taught us two further lessons. 
First, tax relief is not everything. The great success of individual retirement accounts (so-
called “IRAs”) and employer-sponsored retirement saving plans (so-called “401(k) plans”) 
also seems to be due to information and advertising, and a consistent capital market regulation 
that reduced the uncertainty of investors. This is in great contrast to the UK experience, sum-
marised by Disney (1996), where the lack of regulation and information led to the so-called 
mis-selling scandals that undermined investment in private accounts. In this scandal, inappro-
priate financial products were sold to households, often by door-to-door salespersons, result-
ing in huge financial losses to many families. State intervention seems necessary to provide 
                                                 
13 Specified as downpayment restrictions according to Chiuri and Jappelli (2000).  The results should be cau-
tiously interpreted since they rely on a small panel of six countries and five waves. 
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for a smooth working of the capital market. The German experience after the 2001 reform, to 
which we will turn in the second part of this paper, teaches a related lesson: lack of transpar-
ency – ironically created by overregulation – appears to have destroyed all positive incentives 
created by tax relief. 
The second lesson from US experience is that tax relief only works for the upper two third of 
the income distribution. Neither IRAs nor 401(k) plans will have a noticeable impact on fu-
ture retirement income of the lower third of the income distribution. In Germany and in Italy, 
these observations have sparked an extended discussion on whether to make private provision 
mandatory. The argument pro mandatory savings is mainly the need to cover all persons in 
order to avoid pockets of poverty and to prevent moral hazard. The arguments against manda-
tory savings rest on the well known economic efficiency arguments against taxation.14  One 
advantage of private savings for old age as opposed to PAYG contributions is that the latter 
have mainly tax character (Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 2001), therefore create dead weight 
losses, while private saving does not. Making saving mandatory, however, introduces an ele-
ment of force, thus shifts savings understood as voluntary insurance premia towards manda-
tory taxes. 
The issue is complicated by moral hazard. As long as the government provides pension in-
come of last resort, voluntary savings is a waste – from the individual point of view, at least 
among those in the lowest parts of the earnings distribution  – if one can just as well apply for 
social assistance. People may therefore opt for mandatory savings in order to reduce moral 
hazard. 
While most economists do not like the incentives costs associated with mandating retirement 
saving, Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001 and 2002a) actually find that most workers 
in France, Germany, Italy and Spain prefer a pension reform with mandatory savings over a 
reform with voluntary savings. Besides the moral hazard argument, there are many other ex-
planations for this finding, such as the already mentioned lack of self -control and the fear of 
procrastination, the expected higher likelihood of government bail-out if a pension fund fails 
in which mandatory savings were invested, etc. All of these arguments underscore a need for 
government intervention – most strongly, in the imposition of a mandatory saving plan; less 
strongly, by giving tax relief. 
                                                 
14 Summers (1989). 
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Part II: A Case Study of the Recent German Pension Reform 
In this second part, we describe and analyze the 2001 and 2004 pension reforms in Germany. 
They are a good example for a rather incisive change in pension regime from a monolithic 
pay-as-you-go system to – eventually – a true multipillar system. Section 7 describes the 
status of retirement saving before the 2001 reform, section 8 describes the 2001 and 2004 
reforms, and section 9 attempts a preliminary assessment. 
7.  Retirement saving before the 2001 pension reform 
Tax-favored retirement saving in Germany takes several well-defined forms as occupational 
and individual pension plans. First, there are four types of occupational pensions: (I) direct 
pension promises based on company book reserves, (II) provident funds, independent organi-
zations sponsored by employers, (III) direct insurance, where employers buy whole life insur-
ance for their employees, and (IV) staff pension insurance, where employers set up their own 
insurance-like organization. All these plans are of the “defined benefit” type. Until 2001, de-
fined contribution pension funds – an investment vehicle which is widely used in other coun-
tries – were not permitted in Germany. Table 6 gives an overview of their features. 
Second, the only individual retirement saving form which was tax-favored before the 2001 
pension reform is whole life insurance. Both accrual and benefits are tax exempt; moreover, 
contributions can be deducted from taxes up to a limit which depends on the tax-payers other 
dedicated saving instruments. Tax-favored and subsidized individual retirement accounts 
were introduced in the 2001 reform, see section 8. 
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Table 6: Types of occupational pension systems 
Features Investment Vehicles 
 I II III IV V 
 Direct 
pension 
promise 
(Direkt-
zusage) 
Provident 
funds  
(Unter-
stützungs-
kasse) 
Direct  
insurance 
(Direkt-
versicherung) 
Staff  
pension  
insurance 
(Pensions-
kasse) 
Pension  
funds  
(Pension-
fonds) 
Tax on con-
tributions 
Tax free 1. Flat-rate tax 
2. Fully taxed 
but Riester 
subsidy/ tax 
deductable 
expense 
1. Flat-rate tax 
2. Fully taxed 
but Riester 
subsidy/ tax 
deductable 
expense 
3. Tax free 
until 4% of 
BMG 
1. Fully taxed 
but Riester 
subsidy/ tax 
deductable 
expense 
2. Tax free 
until 4% of 
BMG 
Tax on 
benefits 
Fully taxed 1. Tax on re-
turns only 
2. Fully taxed 
1. Tax on re-
turns only 
2. Fully taxed 
3. Fully taxed 
1. Fully taxed 
2. Fully taxed 
Investment Internal External 
Investment 
rules 
None Acc. Insurance Supervisory 
Act 
None 
Insolvency 
scheme 
Membership in pension 
insurance fund (PSV) 
No Membership 
in PSV 
State super-
vision 
None Federal Insurance Authority (Bundesauf-
sichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen). 
Note: BMG = earnings threshold. Source: Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003). 
 
The institutional breadth of retirement savings and the various forms and levels of taxation 
imposed on them have significant monetary effects. These are calculated in Table 7 and ex-
pressed as after-tax benefits in percent of contributions accumulated over the average length 
of a work life. For ease of comparison, the calculation assumes an identical rate of return of 
3% (including the pay-as-you-go scheme). 
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Table 7: Effects of different taxation rules on retirement saving 
 Public 
retirement 
insurance  
Civil ser-
vant pe n-
sion 
Occupational 
pension I/II 
(pension  
promise/ 
provident 
fund) 
Occupational 
pension III/IV 
(direct  
insurance/ 
staff pension 
insurance) 
Whole life 
insurance  
Investment 
fund 
Tax Regime EEP EET EET TET PEE TTE 
Benefits as 
percent of 
contributions  
173.3% 143.7% 159.9% 142.8% 143.7% 124.8% 
Note: The figures reflect a savings period of 37 years and an annual contribution of EUR 500, a real 
rate of interest of 3%, a retirement age of 65 and an average tax rate of 22%. Deductions are calculated 
on the basis of statutory percentage rates; no account is taken of maximum tax allowance amounts. 
E=tax exempt, P=partially exempt/partially taxed, T=taxed. 
Source: Computed from Börsch-Supan and Lührmann (2000) 
 
 
Table 7 shows that the current situation does not resemble a “level playing field”. Public re-
tirement insurance receives the most preferential tax treatment; investment funds (including 
pension funds) come off worst. The difference in the net benefit payments from the public 
retirement insurance scheme and an investment fund is almost 50% of contributions. The net 
benefit payments of pension forms which are subject to deferred taxation – public retirement 
insurance, civil servants pensions, and occupational pensions – tend to be higher than net 
benefit payments subject to the other tax principles. Public retirement and occupational pen-
sions generate the highest net benefit payments as only a very minor share of the pension 
benefits (a hypothetical interest portion) is taxed and in many cases, thanks to generous ex-
emptions, no tax is levied at all. 
The unequal tax treatment of different forms of old-age pension provision cast occupational 
pensions and investments in investment funds in a highly unattractive light. While the unequal 
tax treatment of a pure capital investment in equities might be justified because this form of 
saving does not cover biometric risks, the other two investment vehicles do in fact cover these 
risks. 
The asymmetric taxation of state and private old-age pension provision is not only reflected in 
different levels of net benefit payments but also exercises incentive effects and triggers substi-
tution effects. These are apparent from the spread of different forms of private old-age pen-
sion provision in Germany. Of those investing in private forms of pension provision, 71.2% 
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have a life insurance policy but only 15.1% an equity or other investment fund. Occupational 
pensions are the weakest pillar of pension provision in Germany. The volume of such 
schemes is less than half of that of life insurance policies and less than 10 percent of public 
retirement insurance expenditure.15  Among them, the lion share of more than two thirds goes 
to type-I defined benefit pension plans (direct pension promise backed by book reserves) 
which also provide the highest tax advantage, see table 7. 
The composition of financial wealth of German households excluding occupational pension 
wealth is displayed in Table 8. The most important component is whole life insurance, about a 
third of gross financial wealth. This is in line with the econometric studies by Brunsbach and 
Lang (1998) and Walliser and Winter (1999) who exploit cross-sectional variation in tax rates 
and find a significant influence of the favorable tax treatment on the portfolio share of whole 
life insurance in German households. Bonds make up the lions’ share in this category, while 
stocks are less than 10 percent of the average household portfolio. This fact is also significant 
for financial markets, as life-insurance companies have not been allowed to invest signifi-
cantly in stocks in the past, which in turn is one of the main reasons for thin capital markets in 
Germany. Stocks and bonds are tax privileged in so far as capital gains are tax exempt if the 
underlying asset has been held for longer than one year.16 
Table 8: Composition of household wealth, Germany, 1978–1998 
1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 
Savings accounts 33,8% 26,7% 25,2% 17.5% 22,2% 
Building societies 13,6% 13,0% 9,5% 7.5% 7,5% 
Stocks and bonds 16,2% 19,6% 19,7% 31.4% 24,3% 
Life insurance (cash value) 36,4% 36,7% 42,4% 33.3% 30,7% 
Other financial wealth 0,0% 4,0% 3,4% 10.4% 15,3% 
Total gross financial wealth 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note: Household data from the Einkommens- and Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS). 
Source: Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter, Schnabel and Winter (1999) and own computations. 
 
                                                 
15 DIA (1999). 
16 This has recently been changed to two years. 
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8.  The German reforms in 2001 and 200417 
The core of the recent reforms includes two elements. The first core element are significant 
benefit cuts in the PAYG pillar. The replacement rate is successively reduced, implying bene-
fit cuts of about 20% by the year 2040, the projected peak of population aging in Germany. 
This is achieved by a change in the benefits indexation formula in two stages, 2001 with the 
introduction of the “Riester steps” and 2004 with the introduction of the “sustainability fac-
tor”, see Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003). 
The second core element of the Riester reform is the introduction and significant promotion of 
supplementary funded private pensions on the basis of individual retirement accounts (“Ri-
ester pensions”) to fill the pension gap created by the benefit cuts. The objective is to offer 
incentives for people to take out supplementary private pension cover which, in the long term, 
should compensate for the future cuts in public pensions. These pensions are voluntary: there 
will be no legal mandate for people to invest in these additional private schemes. The Riester 
pensions resemble IRAs in the U.S. 
The tax-relief and/or subsidies for Riester pensions can also be used for several types of occu-
pational pensions (direct insurance, staff pension insurance and pension funds , see table 6), 
which merges elements of the existing German DB plans with elements of US-style 401(k) 
plans. 
8.1  Individual retirement accounts (“Riester pensions”) 
The Riester pensions are heavily regulated and many restrictions apply. The most incisive 
restriction is on payment plans. Since additional private pension schemes are intended to sup-
plement or replace benefits from the public pension scheme, the government decided that in-
centives will only be available for investment vehicles which guarantee payment of a life an-
nuity payable from the date of retirement. Investment vehicles which provide for lump-sum 
disbursements are not subject to state subsidies.18 This restriction has already met with con-
siderable criticism in the public debate as it excludes other forms of provision for old age 
(such as investments in old-age or nursing homes). 
                                                 
17 This and the following section draw on Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003) who provide further details. 
18 If a lump -sum payment is chosen, all subsidies have to be reimbursed to the tax authorities. 
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The incentives provided by the state can take two forms: direct savings subsidies or tax-
deductible special allowances. The tax authorities automatically compute which of the two 
forms versions is most advantageous. 
Direct savings subsidy. All dependently employed and certain self employed workers who 
pay personal contributions to a certified retirement pension policy are entitled to receive a 
direct retirement savings subsidy. The subsidy is paid directly into the beneficiary’s saving 
account. A basic subsidy and a child subsidy for each child for which child benefits were re-
ceived during the previous year is paid. Child subsidies are payable to the mother. In the case 
of married couples, both partners receive a basic subsidy if they have each taken out their own 
supplementary private pension policy. In addition, non-entitled partners (such as mothers not 
in paid employment) are also entitled to receive the full subsidy for their own retirement pen-
sion policy provided that the respective married partner subject to compulsory insurance con-
tributions has paid his or her minimum personal contribution to their supplementary retire-
ment pension policy (see below). 
  Table 9: Direct savings subsidies 
From … on Savings rate  Basic subsidy  
[Euro p.a.] 
Child subsidy 
[Euro p.a.] 
2002 1 percent 38 46 
2004 2 percent 76 92 
2006 3 percent 114 138 
2008 4 percent 154 185 
Source: Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003). 
Table 9 shows the maximum incentive subsidies available as of 2002. In order to qualify for 
the maximum subsidy the beneficiary must invest a specified percentage of his or her gross 
earnings (denoted as “saving rate”). This percentage increases until 2008 in four steps. The 
percentage is applied to the actual earnings level, capped at the same cap as the PAYG contri-
butions are (about 2 times average earnings). If less money is invested, the state subsidy is 
reduced accordingly. The scheme is complicated by the fact, that the subsidy is included in 
the savings amount. Hence, the actual saving rate necessary for the maximum subsidy is 
lower than the percentages indicated in the second column of table 9. In turn, certain mini-
mum amounts are necessary, see table 10. 
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Table 10: Minimum Savings 
Year No child One child Two or more children 
2002 – 2004 45 38 30 
As of 2005 90 75 60 
Source: Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003). 
Tax deductible special expenses. Alternatively, qualifying retirement savings can be de-
ducted as “special allowances” from income taxes. This is usually more advantageous for 
workers with higher than average earnings. Saving rates, caps etc. are the same as in the sub-
sidy case. Table 11 shows the maximum tax-deductible contributions to private retirement 
savings accounts. 
Table 11: Maximum Savings 
From … on Tax deductible special expenses in Euro/Year 
2002 525 
2004 1.050 
2006 1.575 
2008 2.100 
Source: Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003). 
Criteria for individual pension plans eligible for subsidies/tax relief. Individual retirement 
accounts only qualify for state promotion if they meet criteria laid down in the new Certifica-
tion of Retirement Pension Contracts Act (“AltZertG”). It contains a long list of rules which 
make the system complex for customers and potential insurers alike. Qualifying pension plans 
require certification by the Federal Financial Markets Authority (“Bundesanstalt für Finanzdi-
enstleistungs- und Finanzmarktaufsicht”) which will be granted automatically if they fulfill 
the following preconditions: 
1. The investor must be committed to making regular, voluntary pension contributions. 
2. Pension benefits may only be paid out when the beneficiary reaches the age of 60 at the earli-
est or upon reaching retirement age. 
3. At the beginning of the disbursement phase, the accrued pension contributions (inclusive of 
subsidies) must be guaranteed (i.e., the nominal rate of return must be nonnegative). 
4. Pension payments must guarantee lifelong benefits which retain or increase their nominal 
value, i.e. in the form of a life annuity or disbursement plan linked to lifelong annual install-
ments. 
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5. The disbursement plan must continue to provide benefits until the beneficiary reaches the age 
of 85 and subsequently provide a life annuity guaranteed by the capital available at the begin-
ning of the disbursement phase. 
6. Supplementary survivor’s coverage must not have features which offset the original plan. 
7. Initial commission and administrative charges must be spread equally over a period of at least 
10 years. 
8. The investor must be informed about the following issues before taking out the policy: The 
level and distribution over time of commission and administrative costs, the cost of switching 
to a different policy, the costs of financial management, the costs involved in changing to a 
different insurer. 
9. The investor must be informed once a year during the term of the policy about how his or her 
contributions are being used, capital formation, costs and yields, and also about whether and to 
what extent the insurer takes account of ethical, social and ecological investment criteria. 
10. The investor must have the right to suspend contributions during the saving phase, to allow the 
policy to continue running without making additional contributions, or to terminate the policy 
by serving three months notice to the end of the quarter. 
11. Policy rights may not be assigned or transferred to third parties. Claims to pension benefits 
cannot, as a result, be bequeathed. 
Products eligible for subsidy support and into which old-age pension contributions and the 
proceeds on such contributions may be invested include pension insurance and capitalization 
products, bank accounts with accumulated interest and shares in growth and distributing in-
vestment funds. These products are offered by life insurance companies, banks, capital in-
vestment companies, financial services institutions and secur ities services companies. 
8.2  State promotion of occupational pension schemes 
The Riester reform remained largely undecided on the role of occupational pensions versus 
individual accounts. Traditionally, occupational pensions have played a minor role in Ger-
many, particularly in comparison with other countries. Demand for participation in occupa-
tional pension schemes has also been falling in recent years.19  On the other hand, occupa-
tional pensions may provide a psychological substitute for mandated private pensions. In or-
der to strengthen occupational pensions, additional (implicit and explicit) subsidies were in-
troduced with the Riester reform. 
                                                 
19 See Ruppert (2000). 
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The Riester reform introduced pension funds as a vehicle for occupational pensions – an in-
vestment vehicle which is widely used in other countries, but was not permitted in Germany. 
There are now five different investment vehicles in German occupational pension schemes, 
but only three are eligible for Riester incentives: direct insurance, staff pension insurance and 
pension funds (see table 6). As the employer has to provide the employee with the possibility 
to benefit from the Riester incentives, this means – especially for smaller companies – that 
some companies now have to restructure their pension schemes. 
The most important change is the general right to convert part of the salary directly into con-
tributions to pension plans. This applies regardless of whether the contributions are paid by 
the employer or the employee. Arrangements may be based both on gross or net pay. If they 
are based on net pay, there is a large implicit subsidy since the so-converted salary may not 
only be subject to deferred taxation but can also be exempt from social security contributions, 
at least until 2008. If they are based on gross pay, contributions may enjoy the same direct 
subsidies or tax relief as contributions to individual accounts, as long as the occupational pen-
sions meet certain criteria which are less restrictive than the criteria for individual pension 
plans. Which contribution rules apply depends on the chosen investment vehicle and the in-
centives they attract (see table 6). Collective barga ining agreements, however, have prece-
dence over the right to convert salary. This means that an employee covered by a binding col-
lective agreement is only entitled to convert his or her pay into pension if this is explicitly 
provided for in the terms of the collective agreement. This rule makes sure that employers and 
unions can impose their own rules on occupational pension plans. 
8.3  Deferred taxation 
Contributions to the Riester pensions introduced in 2001 will be tax exempt during the saving 
phase, pension payments during the benefit phase will be taxed in full as normal income. This 
applies to all benefits regardless of whether these accrue from contributions, subsidies or capi-
tal gains. One may regard this as another form of subsidy, since taxes occur later in life 
(hence, an implicit tax credit) and usually at a lower rate due to progressivity.20 
The 2004 tax reform has introduced tax-deferred taxation to all other retirement saving vehi-
cles as well, including public pensions. This requires a complex transition process. Currently, 
public pensions are taxed “EEP”, see table 5, 6 and 7. Only a part of the hypothetically ac-
                                                 
20 Börsch-Supan and Lührmann (2000). The “tax credit” feature depends on the an income or consumption tax 
point of view. 
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crued interest is taxed after retirement (this part is assumed to be 27% of benefits if retirement 
takes place at the “normal” age of 65; 32% at early retirement with age 60). In 2005, this tax-
able fraction will jump to 50%, and successively increase to 80% in 2020 and 100% in 2040. 
During a substantially shorter time span, contributions to all retirement schemes (public, oc-
cupational and individual) will become tax deductible, see figure 4. It begins with 60% of 
contributions in 2005 and successively increases to 100% in 2025. This scheme avoids double 
taxation (with a few exceptions), but incurs substantial revenue losses (about 1 billion Euro 
per year until 2006). 
Figure 4: Transition to deferred taxation in Germany 
2005 2025 2040
60%
100% 100%
Deductible contributions
2005 2020 2040
50%
80%
100%
27%
Tax rate on benefits
 
9.  An assessment of the Riester pension plans 
The introduction of the Riester pensions in 2001 offers a fascinating case study in the poten-
tial success and failure of tax-favored but voluntary retirement saving. Will workers overcome 
the temptations to procrastinate? How many will build up supplementary pensions? How 
much will they save? 
At this point, only three years since their introduction, it is too early to tell. It took about 
about a decade to popularize a general subsidized dedicated savings program in Germany 
(“Vermögenswirksame Leistungen”, directly deducted from payroll) which now enjoys almost 
universal participation. In the US, IRAs needed equally long to be accepted by a large share 
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of households, and participation is still biased towards the well-to-do. In this section, we look 
at the design and the incentives in order to understand who is likely to take up the newly cre-
ated Riester pensions. 
9.1  Depth of subs idies versus administrative restrictions  
The first aspect is the depth of Riester incentives. As described in the preceding section, there 
are two kinds of incentives: the subsidies and tax exemptions during the contribution phase 
and tax-related advantages or disadvantages during the disbursement phase. The direct subs i-
dies during the contribution phase are very deep for those who have relatively low income and 
those who have children. The reverse is the case for the tax-deductible special allowances, 
due to the progressive tax system. Here, households with higher incomes benefit more. This 
results in a U-shaped relation between subsidies and income, visible in figure 5 which shows 
the subsidy as a percentage of savings in form of the new supplementary pensions.21 
Figure 5: Depth of subsidies to Riester pensions 
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Note: Direct subsidy/the tax advantage as a percentage of savings in form of the new supplementary pensions. 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2002). 
 
For lowest income households, the subsidy is almost as large as the contribution itself. Even 
for the well-to-do, subsidy rates are high around 40-50 percent. Given these deep subsidies, 
uptake is likely to be high. Figure 3, however, is only one part of the picture. The U-shaped 
                                                 
21 We use the word “subsidy” for both the direct subsidy and the tax-deductible special allowance. 
Mean=42.000 Euro 
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curve will eventually be flattened out during the disbursement phase when pension benefits 
will be taxed. This flattening effect is due to the impact of progressive taxation. Taxation will 
not affect pensioners in the lower half of the income distribution because their pension in-
come is below the still generous exemption for retired households. It will, however, consid-
erably reduce the effective lifetime subsidy to households with incomes above average. The 
tax relief for Riester pensions, therefore, are heavily tilted towards those households who are 
less likely to invest in old-age provision, given the experience in other countries (notably the 
United Kingdom and the United States). 
While the depth of the incentives makes Riester pensions rather attractive, and especially so 
for the less well-to-do, they are less flexible than other retirement investment products. One of 
the main complaints is that most of the capital has to be annuitized and can therefore not be 
used as collateral (e.g., for a mortgage) or be bequeathed. The argument lacks a certain logic 
since the very objective of the Riester pensions is to provide annuity income in order to fill 
the pension gap emerging from the reduced PAYG pillar. Nonetheless, the widely voiced ar-
gument is a clear indication that most workers have not yet realized that they will depend on 
Riester pensions for a reasonable retirement income. 
The extensive certification requirements severely restrict private providers’ scope to develop 
new private insurance products and lead to higher costs. Certain cost items can result in total 
costs of up to 20 percent, compared with around 10 percent for a normal capital sum life in-
surance policy. 22  What is more, the certification rules merely serve to create a formal product 
standard without creating the transparency needed in order to compare different investment 
vehicles and the relative rates of return they offer. As a result, customers are often not in a 
position to make truly informed private investment decisions. The guarantee of the nominal 
value of contributions does ensure that, on retirement, at the very least the nominal capital 
saved is available as pension capital. However, there are set ways to provide indexation which 
is needed in order to ensure that the value of pension benefits paid out from the saved capital 
can be maintained over the long term. Riester benefits that are defined in nominal Euros will 
lose their value even at very modest rates of inflation given the long terms involved. 
                                                 
22 Stiftung Warentest (2002). 
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9.2  Preliminary evidence on take-up rates 
First survey results show that demand for Riester products is sluggish: only around 9 percent 
had actually taken out a policy by mid 2002; a further 16 percent planned to conclude a policy 
by the end of 2002. By the end of 2003, however, the take-up rate has increased to about 35 
percent of all eligible workers. 
This comes during a growing trend for workers to enroll in supplementary pension plans. 
Only around half of those planning to enroll in such plans are considering doing so in the 
framework of a Riester pension. The other half prefer other savings and insurance products, 
and/or occupational pensions.23  Moreover, many households, especially in the higher income 
brackets, merely may restructure their existing pension plans in order to reap Riester subs i-
dies. Börsch-Supan, Heiss und Winter (2004) provide evidence for such substitution. Slightly 
more than 50 percent in a representative sample of German workers who invested in Riester 
pensions claimed that they simply pushed funds from unsubsidized retirement savings into 
Riester pensions, while 37 percent answered that they created new savings. 
Finally, there is consistent evidence that take-up rates of private retirement saving are much 
higher among those who are well informed about the pension system (know the contribution 
rate, know the pay-as-you-go mechanism, know that aging will put additional pressure on 
public pension systems), see Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001, 2002a and b) and 
Börsch-Supan, Heiss und Winter (2004). Information and knowledge creation, therefore, 
seems to be an important incentive to boost retirement saving. 
10.  Summary and Conclusions 
This paper provides a mixed bag of insights. First, the amount of retirement saving needed to 
fill the pension gaps created by pension reform all over Europe is substantial. Increasing the 
household saving rate by 4%, the benchmark in Germany, is a major feat. 
Second, there is clear evidence tax relief shifts saving into those channels which enjoy the 
highest tax relief. Third, equally clear is the evidence on substitution between PAYG pensions 
and private retirement savings in the long run, as seen in the cross-national evidence. People 
eventually adjust their behavior to the generosity of public pension systems like in a system of 
communicating pipes. The current level of taxes appears to be uncorrelated with these ad-
                                                 
23 Leinert (2003). 
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justments. This does not necessarily imply that tax incentives boosting retirement savings are 
superfluous, since in the short-run, they might help in a transition to a new regime. The strong 
substitution effect suggests that information about the future level of PAYG benefits seems to 
be an important policy tool in order to instigate private retirement saving. 
Fourths, the paper unfortunately adds little to the core question, whether tax relief creates ad-
ditional new savings. This is in spite of the large institutional variation in Europe. While we 
do know that subsidies strongly increase saving in the specific form that is subsidized, possi-
bly to the detriment of other saving forms, we do not really have firm evidence that saving-
related tax relief or similar subsidies increase total saving in Europe. 
This does not make tax-relief a potentially wasteful instrument. Even if tax relief would only 
shift other saving to retirement saving, this may be a valuable mechanism if the government 
wants to make sure that the elderly will have a generous multipillar retirement income. That 
is, even if the government does not believe in the creation of new saving for macroeconomic 
purposes, it still may want to repress procrastination not only in form of consumption now, 
but also in the form of a larger house in the near future, and subsidize retirement consumption 
in the far future. 
Finally, the German reforms in 2001 and 2004 have successfully installed a political process 
that will stabilize contribution rates to the PAYG public pension system, avoiding further 
harm to labor markets and economic growth. However, the jury is still out whether the result-
ing pension gap will be closed by tax-favored and subsidized retirement saving. Shifting to 
deferred taxation will cost the German government 6 billion Euros in lost revenues. So far, 
uptake rates are small. The German experience certainly teaches that tax relief can be made 
fruitless if it is combined with intransparent regulations restricting investment possibilities 
and withdrawal plans. In addition, information was poor. The German government tried to 
convince workers that the cuts in the PAYG pillar are relatively small – this certainly did not 
help the drive to start building up unprecedented second and third pillars. 
To sum up, my reading of the evidence in Germany and Europe at large is that the best policy 
in order to boost retirement saving is a transparent description of the level of future PAYG 
pensions. Tax relief may serve well as an instrument to dampen liquidity problems especially 
among young families who have children and need to invest in homeownership. The crucial 
mechanism, however, is simply the substitution between declining PAYG pensions and re-
tirement savings: Mind the pension gap! 
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